![]() ![]() Thus, even if Putin were to attempt a “bigger war,” it would probably come with a significant lag.* 1 In addition, come autumn, rains will make large offensive operations more difficult. Moreover, for Putin to attempt a bigger war, the Russian armed forces first need to successfully complete their efforts to deflect Ukraine’s own multi-pronged prolonged offensive. Then, it would take at least several months for the newly-mobilized to be trained for offensive operations, which are typically more difficult to execute than defensives ones. ![]() ![]() For one, such an escalation would require mass mobilization on a scale that could create public backlash inside Russia as recently-passed laws make it hard for conscripts to protest with their feet. However, it is unclear whether Putin will escalate hostilities, at least in the short-term future. On one hand, it is reasonable to expect Putin to continue betting on outlasting Ukraine and its allies on and off the battlefield, given IMF-certified prospects of economic growth in 2023-2024, potential fatigue in countries that have backed Ukraine so far and other factors. Gabuev backs his proposition with the following developments: the Russian parliament has passed a law that makes it easier to conscript many more Russians the Russian economy is expected to grow, and its defense sector remains resilient and the Kremlin has an enduring hope that Russia can strangle the Ukrainian economy. Is Putin betting on a bigger war in Ukraine? Yes, and he is not looking for off-ramps, according to Carnegie Endowment’s Alexander Gabuev’s commentary in FT. ![]()
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